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Abstract
In this article, a single poster of the Peopleʼs Democratic Party of Afgh-
anistan is discussed. The starting point for the project is the statement
that persuasion is more effective than compulsion and the fact that the
Afghan communists did not find any formula to start an effective dia-
logue with their society. The primary question for the article is: what
kind of communication, and what sort of themes and motifs played a
significant role in conveying revolutionary ideology aimed at a society
where a majority, with political potential, could not read or write?
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Our party is our school / And our laughter / We are its guard /
We follow its path / (…) / We are scouts / And we are equal /
If you fight with the enemy / You are the scoutsʼ friend1
The article, as a continuation of a text published in 20152, is part of a re-
search project on the propaganda employed by the would-be Leninist gov-
ernment represented by the Peopleʼs Democratic Party of Afghanistan (here-
after: PDPA)3.The language as well as themedium of communication applied
by the regime while addressing its audience – i.e. the Afghan society – are
important for two reasons: firstly, because the authorities are granted confid-
ence by the citizens who at the same time have the right to prolong (or not)
their credit of trust depending on the current political, social and economic
situation. To stay in power, the authorities use phraseology that is clear for
the audience, convincing them of their own version of politics and vision of
reality4:
A basic step in accomplishing this transformation is to gain an
absolute dominance over the sources of information available
to the invaded people, thereby regulating what they read, what
they hear and, over a time, how they view their history and
themselves5.
Such a conclusion moves us towards the second reason – the clarity and
obscurity of the message. The majority of the Islamic elites, confronting the
need for modernisation, remained loyal to their religion, its ideas, values and
language, but there was a small group that praised Western achievements.
1 Khoshe-ye khorshid. Gozine-ye sheʼr-e kudak [Rays of sunshine. Selections from poetry for chil-
dren], Kabol 1363AP/1984–5, p. 24 [trans. MMK].
2 M. M. Kłagisz, Visual Propaganda in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan – Preliminary
Report, “The Polish Journal of the Arts and Culture” 2015, no. 14 (2), pp. 101–122.
3 I use the expression “would-be Leninist” following O. Royʼs statement: “One can wonder if
Afghan communists (who always refrained from referring to communism) are truly com-
munists” (O. Roy, The Origins of the Afghan Communist party, “Central Asian Survey” 1988,
no. 7 (2–3), p. 52).
4 A. Kampka, Retoryka jako manifestacja i uprawomocnienie władzy [in:] Między znaczeniem
a działaniem. Retoryka i władza, ed. A. Kampka, Warszawa 2012, pp. 19 ff.
5 A. Rasul Amin, A General Reflection on the Stealthy Sovietisation of Afghanistan, “Central
Asian Survey” 1984, no. 3 (1), p. 47.
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They created their own tongue that was largely unknown to most of their
(il)literate compatriots. H. Enayatʼs words that:
The breakdown of the cultural integration of traditional soci-
ety was thus reflected in a linguistic rift, which has been one
of the chief obstacles to a coherent, sustained and fruitful de-
bate among Muslims of all classes and ages over their social and
political problems6,
should be kept in mind, while reading this text based on a combined philo-
logical-and-anthropological approach proposed by R. Barthes in his article
Rhetoric of the Image7.
R. Barthes, posing such questions as “How does meaning get into the
image?Where does it end? And if it ends, what is there beyond?”8, considered
not whether the image could function as a conveyor of meaning, but how it
would actually do that. In his opinion, the picture needs to constitute its own
language. In the context of politics, such tools of rhetoric used to manifest or
legitimatise authority should be understood as a perlocutionary act affecting
the addressee9. In the context of Afghanistan, the phenomenon of the Bild-
kultur – introduced in the Preliminary Report – is inevitable.The Bildkultur is
an open-access, culturally-constructed semantic system made up of pictorial
signs used for mass (re-)creation, (re-)transfer and (re-)storage of common
memory on the same (or similar) terms as the high or popular Afghan poetry
has been doing for centuries. R. Barthes wrote that: “[t]here are those who
think that the image is an extremely rudimentary system in comparison with
language and those who think that signification cannot exhaust the imageʼs
ineffable richness”10. Therefore, the picture plays a more complex role than
merely aesthetic11 and embraces, inter alia, the takbir sentence Allahu akbar
6 H. Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought, Austin 1982, p. 3.
7 Cf. also: E. Bauer, Sprachlicher Wandel als Ergebnis politisch motivierter Sprachlenkung:
neuere Entwicklungen im Pashto Afghanistans, [in:] Proceedings of the Second European Con-
ference of Iranian Studies held in Bamberg, 30th September to 4th October 1991, by the Societas
Iranologica Europeae, eds. B. G. Fragner et al., Rome 1995, pp. 53–63.
8 R. Barthes, Rhetoric of the Image, [in:] Barthes R., Image – Music – Text, trans. S. Heath, New
York 1977, p. 32.
9 J. L. Austin,Mówienie i poznawanie. Rozprawy i wykłady filozoficzne, przeł. B. Chwedeńczuk,
Warszawa 1993, p. 317.
10 R. Barthes, op. cit., p. 32.
11 P. Chelkowski, H. Dabashi, Staging a Revolution: The Art of Persuasion in the Islamic Republic
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“God is the greatest”, the basmala one b-ismi-llahi-r-rahmani-r-rahimi “In
the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful”, or the name of the
Prophet Muhammad that can be “read” in public by illiterates too because
they recognise their complex calligraphic structures rather than particular
letters12. Taking into account the traditional Islamic approach towards the
picture, one should emphasise here that in Sunni Afghanistan, the Bildkultur,
represented by Bollywood/Lollywood posters, religious pictures, naïve paint-
ings on trucks, in tea-houses, school books and bills, flyers, hoardings, pho-
tography and television is, contrary to its neighbours Iran and Pakistan, still
in stadium nascendi13.
An example of the Afghan Bildkultur is a mural photographed by P. Cent-
livres andM. Centlivres-Demont in October 1990 in Kabul (see: figure 1). One
can see a girl giving water to an apparently tired solder sitting on the ground.
The girl wears a chador tightly wrapped around her figure. The authors sug-
gested that such a piece of cloth refers to the Muslim tradition rather than
to the leftist ideology of the Kabul regime, but we should recall here another
pro-government poster from the mid 1980s in which a woman, encouraging
young men to join the national army, wears a chador too.
This dress may somehow refer to M. Najibullahʼs political return toward
“Afghanicity” understood as traditionalism as well as an abandonment of the
previously used socialist stylistics. In a booklet published on the occasion
of the 10th Congress of the PDPA, one can read that due to historical and
cultural peculiarities it is impossible to build socialism in Afghanistan, and
that the PDPA itself must be of a Marxist-Leninist character(!):
Question 2: Is the PDPA a Marxist-Leninist party?
Answer: The PDPA frankly announced that there were no con-
ditions in the country to build socialism. (…) On the contrary,
the PDPA claimed that it adopted methods to solve problems
of Iran, New York 1999, p. 34; J. S. Elias,Aishaʼs Cushion. Religious Art, Perception, and Practice
in Islam, Cambridge MA–London 2012, p. 18 [useful references].
12 J. S. Elias, op. cit., pp. 236–263.
13 On Afghan visual arts, e.g.: M. Centlivres-Demont, Popular Art in Afghanistan. Paintings on
Trucks, Mosques and Tea-Houses, trans. R. Charleston, Graz 1976; P. Centlivres, M. Centlivres-
Demont, Et si on parlait de lʼAfghanistan. Terrains et textes 1964–1980, Paris 1988, pp. 95–117;
L. Dzięgiel, J. Pstrusińska, Rysunkowe echa egzotycznej wojny, “Arcana” 2001, no. 41 (5),
pp. 167–172; M. Vogel, Roter Teufel – mächtiger muğahid. Widerstandsbilder im sowjetisch-
afghanischen Krieg 1979–1989, Wien–Köln–Weimar 2008.
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according to the national reconciliation philosophy and fought
to realise them. Thus the PDPA cannot be a Marxist-Leninist
party14.
Fig. 1
The pictorial semantic system of the Bildkultur means that the ideological
ambiguity of the Kabul regime in the 1980s/1990s is reflected in the figure of
the solder too. Does he wear a képi (a headdress typical for the state army) or
14 30 soʼal va 30 javab dar bare-ye H.D.Kh.A. va siyasat-e an [30 questions and 30 answers about
the PDPA and its politics], Kabol 1369AP/1990–1, p. 2 [trans. MMK].
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a turban (headgear worn by guerrillas)? Additionally, the painting suggests
that the official system, where women have their place, is less warlike and
more charitable15. Afghan charity and benevolence appear in the figure of
the girl symbolising the homeland (as well as the Kabul-based government),
although in common Afghan imagination the homeland is perceived as mas-
culine rather than feminine; is this a Soviet import?16
As in the Preliminary Report, the core element of the paper is a single
socialist realistic poster published in a Moscow-printed album Afganistan,
revolucya prodolzhayecya.This time thematter of concernwas the creation of
a myth of an all-Afghan proletarian uprising against M. D. Khanʼs régime and
its transferral to placards and postage stamps. This time a poster dedicated
to the leadership role of the PDPA will be discussed because: “[t]he leading
role of the party is a prerequisite for seizure of power and ruling by the
working class while building socialism”17. Considering the nature of socialist
realism accompanied by the acceptance of the artificially created world that
is validated later by the stamp of normality, the poster tries to convince us
that the others have accepted the truth about the PDPAʼs leadership before
us:
A newcomer climbed yesterday
onto the refractory rock
in fear of darkness and despair.
His every step makes time bright,
His every breath is a fervour of triumph,
He is able to act even if we cannot,
He knows what we do not.
Who is he?
A newly-found mystic,
Some-one who opens [us] new places to stay,
15 P. Centlivres, M. Centrlivres-Demont M., Portraits dʼAfghanistan, Paris 2002, p. 210.
16 Cf. Also: M.-O. Terrenoire,Guerre dʼAfghanistan – Images de femmes, “Central Asian Survey”
1987, no. 6( 3), pp. 77–102. One can recall here Nazo Tokhay (17th/18th c.) – a Pashtun poet
and warrior who later became the “Mother of Afghan Nation” (M. Hotak bin Davud, Pata
Khazana, Kabol 1339AP/1960–1, pp. 176–179), as well as Malalay who led Afghan fighters
against the British troops at the Battle of Maiwand on 27th July 1880. One should also con-
sider here Bharat Mata – the national personification of India presented as a mother goddess
(M. Gaenszle, J. Gengnagel, Visualizing Space in Banaras. Images, Maps, and the Practice of
Representation, Wiesbaden 2006, pp. 177 ff.).
17 Partia – państwo – społeczeństwo, ed. R. Dudek, Z. Siembirowicz, Warszawa 1978, p. 55.
PJAC New Series 5 (1/2017): 67–87
Kłagisz, Visual Propaganda… 73
A lover that does not fear death.
Someone who has just started but leads others.
In yesterday’s deadly chill
he kindled tomorrow’s temple of fire,
(…)
We have lost our way in darkness,
Hey, finder of illuminated paths
Pay attention to the lost caravan
As it is fine and you know18.
The fragility of its social leading role became significant shortly after the
PDPA, internally divided between two antagonised Khalq and Parcham fac-
tions, seized power during a one-day military coup dʼétat on 27th April 1978.
No-one could expect that the communists would so quickly be at each other’s
throats and so easily antagonise their own society by manifesting their lack
of awareness of the dynamics characteristic of the Afghan political landscape.
Popular local uprisings against the regime started in the summer of 1978,
proving an unwritten law that being too proud and too confident does not
guarantee success19. At the beginning of the 1980s, the new Central Com-
mittee of the PDPA, established thanks to the Soviet military intervention in
December 1979, tried initially to broaden its social base to counteract guer-
rilla activity and to support its own government but failed in the end. Fa-
cing, inter alia, lasting political-and-military upheavals B. Karmal – the con-
temporaneous General Secretary of the CC of the PDPA and Chairman of
the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council – referred to a typical Marxist-
Leninist form of rule promoted by his Soviet advisers who even wrote his
speeches. Since 1981 a few umbrella organisations supporting the PDPA gov-
ernment were established to imitate political pluralism. Their common pur-
pose was to mobilise non-party supporters and to carry party decisions to
the public, as well as to demonstrate closeness and unity between both the
PDPA and the society, because:
The leading position and role of the communist party in the
system of political organisation and in the system of a socialist
society finds expression in its creative inspirational and
18 S. Layeq, Samt-e roushan-e jaddaha [The bright side of the roads], Kabol 1363AP/1984–5,
pp. 1–2 [trans. MMK].
19 T. Barfield, Afghanistan. A Cultural and Political History, Princeton–Oxford 2010, p. 164.
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programmatic activities towards the socialistic state allied with
political clubs, trade unions, youth and other social organisa-
tions20.
This manœuvre was also necessary by virtue of some specific features
of Afghan politics where: “[t]he periodic and often-rapid collapses of state
power (…) had their roots in the persistence of violence at the top of the sys-
tem”21 and “(…) that after the fall of the monarchy in 1973, each succeeding
regime had a weaker claim to political legitimacy than had its predecessor
in the eyes of ordinary Afghans”22. Under the circumstances, the PDPA was
compelled to create its proletarian myth ex nihilo and to sell the society its
right to rule, constantly referring to the party–masses union. One of the
many ways to reach out to citizens so that they could become aware of the
PDPA was a poster like this:
Fig. 2
Following R. Barthesʼ article, one can study this poster on three levels: (1)
a linguistic message easily distinguishable from (2) a coded iconic one, and
finally (3) a non-coded iconic message23.
The first kind of the message, of linguistic substance, appears on the
poster twice – once as a turgid exclamation: Hezb va mardom ba ham-and
20 Partia – państwo – społeczeństwo, op. cit., pp. 57–58.
21 T. Barfield, op. cit., p. 164.
22 Ibidem, pp. 164–165.
23 R. Barthes, op. cit., p. 36.
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“The party and the people are together” and other as an ideological declara-
tion: Barname-ye hezb-ra amali minamaʼim “We execute the programme of
the party in practice”. Although R. Barthes writes that the linguistic message
appears somewhat before the two others24, one can dispute this assumption
by raising the issue of illiterate addressees. To decipher the code of the mes-
sage incorporated into the poster, one need to possess two sorts of skills –
knowledge of the script and command of the Dari language. In the case of
the illiterate, a command of language is not enough to decode the message
even if (s)he is a Dari native speaker unless the message is verbalised by
someone else. If no-one can verbalise it, this part remains mute and must be
expressed by the pictorial element. This means that there is a slight variation
in reading the posters, because a literate person first caches the text while
moving his/her attention towards the graphic, yet an illiterate ignores the
text, focusing on the picture only25.
According to R. Barthes, the linguistic message can be consolidated into
two closely relatedmessages – denoted and connoted. It means that the noun
hezb “party” does not only substitute the name of the PDPA, but further-
more via a sub-/semi-/un-/conscious reference to general ideas regarding
its political programme it exposes the observer to additional value – that
of Marxism-Leninism (even if B. Karmal tried to avoid the noun “social-
ism” in his speeches26) or rather of “Sovieticity” as the political awareness
24 Ibidem, p. 33.
25 The literate addressee can see the image and read the words, while the illiterate one can
only see the image. This means that the combination of the picture and the slogan oper-
ates on two levels. The first one is of a mixed visual-and-verbal character, while the second
one is of a visual nature only (P. Chelkowski, H. Dabashi, op. cit., p. 42). Since the poster
must grab the observer’s attention to unveil its message and to make a long-lasting impres-
sion on him/her, its potency results primarily from clarity of its own language conveyed
by the picture and only secondly by the word. This means that the poster makes use of the
Bildkultur, i.e. such sets of symbols that are coherent, understandable and self-explanatory
for everyone notwithstanding (il)literacy.
26 Thewould-be Marxist-Leninist linchpin of the PDPA instigated attempts to adopt the figure
of V. I. Ulyanov Lenin for local political proposes. On the 110th anniversary of his birthday
a series of commemorative articles were published in the Haqiqat-e Enqelab-e Saur [Truth
of the April Revolution] 03.02.1360AP / 23.04.1981, no. 101 (hereafter: HES; the official news-
paper of the PDPA published between 1980–1990, later replaced by Payam [Message]; the
similarity between its name and the title of the official newspaper of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union – Pravda [Truth], is significant). Readers learned about Leninʼs life and
work (Zendegi va asar-e Lenin [Leninʼs live and works] (p. 3); Sima-ye Lenin dar ayine-ye
zendegi-ye khosusi [Leninʼs picture in the reflection of private life] (p. 4); Amuzesh-e Lenin –
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of many Afghans was constructed by the presence of the Red Army troops.
The second significant element of the linguistic message is the nounmardom
“people” referring to Afghan society. There is an organic link between both
hezb and mardom as: “The social system characteristic for the socialism cre-
ates, because of its own nature, subjective and objective presumptions for
integration of basic classes and layers of the whole nation”27. The question is
if the usage of the noun mardom, instead of khalq “the people, the masses”,
tuda “the masses” or millat “nation”, was caused by a (sub)conscious inten-
tion to play-down the socialist tone of the poster and intensify its general
message, or not. While khalq or tuda refer to the proletariat directly, and
millat as a “nation” (i.e. more than a “religious community”) is somehow
still a new concept in 20th-century Afghanistan, mardom shall embrace all
members of society such as the urban intelligentsia as well as the tribal aris-
tocracy, because: “In the process of fulfilling the goals of socialism, the party
must also gain the conscious support of the most active and having the social
authority part of the workers and other groups of working people and the
approval of the broad masses”28.
A. Kampka writers that words spoken in a certain place and at a given
time have the strength to determine or validate authority and domination.
The recipientsʼ behaviour is also of a constitutive character because any de-
claration about possession of power would be meaningless without their
nodding consent29. Consequently, “The party and the people are together”
is not a simple statement but a dogmatic piece of hyperbole idealising the
relations between both groups and suggesting that both hold the same posi-
tion. Nonetheless, such equality is illusory because of the nature of the party
as a proletarian avant-garde – i.e. a prerequisite for the worker-and-peasant
administration: “The leading role of the party is a prerequisite for gaining
power and its exercise by the working class in the period of construction of
socialism”30. B. Karmal repeatedly said:
mashʼal-e rahnama-ye razmandegan-e enqelabi [Leninʼs teaching – a guiding torch of revolu-
tionary fighters] (p. 4)), his relations with Afghanistan (Lenin va Afqanestan [Lenin and Afgh-
anistan] (p. 1)) and could see a photography of Lenin while reading Pravda. The picture was
complemented with a slogan – Lenin zist. Lenin me-ziyad. Lenin khahad zist, i.e. a Dari trans-
lation of a Soviet rallying cry based on an omnipresent refrain of V. V. Mayakovskyʼs poem
Komsomolskaya [The Komsomol Song] “Lenin lived, Lenin lives, Lenin is to live forever”.
27 Partia – państwo – społeczeństwo, op. cit., p. 92.
28 Ibidem, p. 99.
29 A. Kampka, op. cit., p. 20.
30 Partia – państwo – społeczeństwo, op. cit., p. 55.
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Thanks to the victory of the Saur Revolution under the guidance
of the PDPA for the first time in the history of [our] country
political power represented by the workers, peasants and the
rest of the working classes has been transferred to the PDPA
[trans. and emphasised by MMK]31.
Our party takes responsibility for ensuring the welfare and fe-
licity of the broad masses of Afghanistan. The PDPA arose from
the masses [and] reflects the interests of the working classes
as well as all progressive forces and realises its duties, serving
the people and the homeland truly [trans. and emphasised by
MMK]32.
What is more, the sentence “The party and the people are together” refers
to a mutual contract signed by both sides sharing common targets. Without
their cooperation it would be impossible to achieve them: “Unity of the party,
the people and themilitary forces guarantees the victory of our revolution”33.
How can such an interpretation be justified? To answer the question,
one should refer to a function of the word called by R. Barthes “anchorage”
that creates self-limited frames in which the addressee places his/her under-
standing of the message, avoiding misleading individualisation and keeping
the core meaning of the announcement. The anchorage function means that
some elements of the message are highlighted and some others are “dark”-
lighted, i.e. rejected as unnecessary, unwanted, redundant or simply wrong.
In the present case, the poster refers to the unity of the PDPA and the Afghan
masses resulting from the proletarian roots of the former, to the cooperation
of both collectivities resulting from common political and economic targets,
as well as to the leading role of the PDPA perceived as the only power able
to (re-)construct the masses by increasing their awareness34. The anchorage
function means also that the poster, being ideologically concerned in, helps
31 B. Karmal, Zenda bad ettehad-e tabaqe-ye kargar, dehqanan va hame-ye zahmatkashan-e
keshvar-e ma! [Viva the unity of the classes of the workers and peasants and all the prolet-
arians of our country!], [in:] B. Karmal, Dar rah-e tahkim-e hakmiyat-e khalq. Majmuʼe-ye
bayahiyaha va neveshtaha (1358–1359) [Towards the strengthening of mass leadership. A col-
lection of speeches and texts (1358–1359)], Kabol 1362AP/1983–4, p. 309.
32 Ibidem, p. 309.
33 A quotation from B. Karmalʼs speech in the HES, 27.07.1362AP / 19.10.1983, no. 648, p. 6.
34 On ideological education see e.g.: Kar dar miyan-e tudaha-ra gostaresh midehad [Work
among the masses widens], “HES” 22.07.1361AP / 14.10.1982, no. 347, p. 3.
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the observer to find the hidden message by giving him/her some intertextual
tips. Intertextuality is a crucial feature of socialist realism that changes the
ideology presented in speeches or slogans into communicable messages35.
On this score one can look for similar slogans in other mass media like the
HES to find, for example: Hezb va mardom ba ham-and! Hezb ba poshtibani-
ye tudeha va tudeha ba pashtibani-ye hezb nirumand-and “The party and the
people are together! The party with the masses” support and the masses
with the partyʼs support are strongʼ in a tree-page article on B. Karmalʼs visit
paid to the workers of the Kabul house plant36, or Hezb va mardom ba ham-
and! Rafiq Babrak Karmal dar miyan-e shahriyan-e Kabol “The party and the
people are together! Comrade Babrak Karmal among the Kabul residents”
in a one-page text on B. Karmalʼs amicable walk and talks to passers-by on
the streets of the capital city37. One can also mention here a non-regular
column entitled Hezb, mardom va qavva-ye mosallah ba ham-and “The party,
the people and the armed forces are together!” which published various texts
dedicated mostly to the National Army, solders and their courage as well as
their letters to the readers of the HES38.
35 Socialist realism forces the observer to interpret the content by viewing it in the light of its
connection with other communications and so it has seemingly little to do with reality and
more with its mythologisation (H. Gyunter, Totalitarnoye gosudarstvo kak sintez iskusstv
[in:] Socrealisticheskiy kanon, eds. H. Gyunter, E. Dobrenko, Sankt-Peterburg 2000, p. 10;
V. Gusev, Gde falsh i gde istina [in:] Agitacyya za schaste. Sovetskoye iskusstvo stalinskoy
epohi, ed. H. Gassner, Sankt-Peterburg–Djusseldorf–Bremen 1994, pp. 14–19; Е. Dobrenko,
Socrealisticheskiy realizm i realnyy socyalizm (Sovetskiye estetika i kritika i proizvodstvo real-
nosti), “Colloquia” 2007, no. 18, pp. 57–91).
36 Dar miyan-e kargaran-e pishtaz-e khanasazi [Among the avant-garde workers of the construc-
tion establishment], “HES” 24.01.1362AP / 13.04.1983, no. 498, pp. 1–3.
37 Rafiq Babrak Karmal dar miyan-e shahriyan-e Kabol [Comrade Babrak Karmal among the
citizens of Kabul], “HES” 09.07.1362AP / 01.10.1983, no. 633, pp. 1–2.
38 E.g.: Sarbazan-e ma hamasa mi-afarinand [Our solders compose an epic], “HES” 03.02.1360AP
/ 23.04.1981, no. 101, p. 2; Sarbazan va afsaran-e qahreman-e ma dar khedmat-e enqelab [Our
brave soldiers and officers in the service of the revolution], “HES” 15.10.1360AP / 05.01.1982,
no. 207, p. 2 [on soldersʼ fights in the Nangarhar Province]; Chehraha sokhan miguyand
[Faces are talking], “HES” 29.10.1360AP / 19.01.1982, no. 213, p. 2 [profiles of a few ordinary
solders]; Tekiya ba niru-ye tudaha [Reliance on mass forces], “HES” 20.11.1360AP / 09.02.1982,
no. 222, p. 2 [on popular support]; Ba qavva-yemosallah dar rah-e taʼmin-e amniyat [Towards
security together with military forces], “HES” 27.11.1360AP / 16.02.1982, n. 225, p. 2; Qavva-
ye mosallah, madrase-ye jangavaran-e enqelab [Military service – the warrior’s school], “HES”
27.11.1360AP / 16.02.1982, n. 225, p. 2 [on the ideological foundations of the civil war];Naqsh-
e qavva-yemosallah dar kar-e edame-ye eslahat-e demurkatik-e arzi [The role ofmilitary forces
in the continuation of land reforms], “HES” 11.12.1360AP / 02.03.1982, no. 231, p. 2; Hamkari-
PJAC New Series 5 (1/2017): 67–87
Kłagisz, Visual Propaganda… 79
The unity, cooperation and leading role of the PDPA is also present in
the second, visually smaller but equally important slogan Barname-ye hezb-
ra amali minamaʼim “We fulfil the programme of the party in practice”, where
the adjective amali “in practice” projects the proletarian, work-oriented nature
of the regime and non-academic realisation of the programme compiled by
the party.The sentence “We fulfil the programme of the party in practice” is a
metaphorical reply to the rallying cry “The party and the people are together”
and also appears in such an appeal as Feysalaha-ye pelinum-ra amali sazim
“Letʼs fulfil the resolutions of the [PDPAʼs] plenum” to be found in the HES;
once again emphasis was placed on action. Interestingly, the last example
is complemented by a small graphic in which a crowd of identical people
follow the very first figure who is considerably bigger, raising his hand in a
tightened fist. His raised hand is also the pole of the PDPA banner:
Fig. 3: HES 27.08.1367AP / 17.11.1988, no. 2219, p. 1.
Fig. 4: HES 20.08.1367AP / 10.11.1988, no. 2213, p. 1. The subheading appeal
Khane-ye hezbi-ye khod-ra pak va roushan sazim “Letʼs clean and illuminate
our party home” refers to political and ideological reforms carried out after
the last Soviet troops left Afghanistan.
Next to a message of linguistic substance R. Barthes distinguished be-
tween two iconic categories – one coded and the other non-coded. Since
both are of the same pictorial nature they cannot be separated from each
other39.
ye qavva-ye mosallah ba mardom [Military forces and the cooperation of the people], “HES”
28.11.1361AP / 17.02.1983, no. 452, p. 6; Ta akharin lahza khahim razmid [We will fight to the
end], “HES” 24.03.1363AP / 13.06.1984, no. 857, p. 6.
39 R. Barthes, op. cit., p 36.
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In the case of the analysed Soviet-style poster those who pause in front of
it can see three figures – the worker, peasant and solder.Those who have any
previous knowledge regarding the Marxism-Leninism can simultaneously
read the ideology submerged behind various graphic elements forming the
whole composition. The central position is occupied by a worker holding a
hammer. He is closer to the bystander than the two other characters of this
pictorial story who stand behind him – on the right-hand side a peasant hold-
ing a spade, on the left a solder holding a rifle. All three stand upright, keenly
eyeing the observer. No-one smiles but we cannot talk about any lack of
friendliness.Their faces express clearly amixture of concentration, dignity or
solemnity of a happening that takes place behind them. Their collectedness
should influence us-observers coming to a conclusion that they are waiting
at this moment for or listening to orders delivered by representatives of the
party. Two graphic elements substitute their willingness to cooperate: firstly,
the slogan Barname-ye hezb-ra amali minamaʼim and, secondly, their tools –
a hammer, spade and rifle. Behind them one can see a crowd of people extend-
ing far beyond the composition, maybe one of the marches organised during
the International Workersʼ Day (1st May) or the anniversaries of the Saur
Revolution (27th April). Such a mass of people must consist of men and wo-
men, workers, peasants, solders, teachers, journalists, academics, clergymen,
urban and tribal elites, etc. It is of course impossible to distinguish all the so-
cial groups in the poster, but the desired collective character of the Afghan
would-be Leninist regime allows us to assume that in the official rhetoric
all of them are present as the crowd and in the innumerable flags represent-
ing the PDPA (the biggest) and its umbrella organisations – e.g. the National
Fatherland Front, the Democratic Youth Organisation of Afghanistan, the
Democratic Organisation of Afghan Women, the Democratic Organisation
of Afghan Scouts or the Union of Journalists – that fly proudly in the wind.
The reference to the mass of people and various organisations emphasises
the unity, cooperation and leading role of the PDAP that results from its
alliance with all the different social groups:
The government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan con-
sists of the political authority of the workers, peasants and other
working classes as well as the national and democratic forces of
the country that came into being thanks to the will, cooperation
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and support of all the working classes and true compatriots of
our dear homeland – Afghanistan40.
Little wonder that the PDPA, as an organisation of would-be socialist
roots, appears in the press graphic presented below not only as the simple
togetherness of people sharing common political targets but first of all as
a leading force able to draw their society into fulfilling its own ideological
programme:
Fig. 5: HES 01.10.1360AP / 22.12.1981, no. 205, p. 1. The illustration accom-
panies a series articles published on the 18th anniversary of the establishing
the PDPA called officially “[the] party of martyrs and heroes”.
This graphic makes readers of the HES aware of the PDPAʼs ideological
nature as well as its political goals. A man, most likely a toiler and one of a
group formed byworkers of indeterminate age, peasants, solders andwomen,
holds the banner on which the PDPAʼs emblem – a single ear of wheat en-
closed by a cog – can be clearly seen. The entire composition also articulates
40 B. Karmal, op. cit., p. 309. See also e.g.: Ma hama bayad dast ba dast-e ham be-dehim [We
should shake hands together], “HES” 29.10.1360AP / 19.01.1982, no. 213, p. 1; Rah-e hezb,
rah-e nejat-e zahmatkashan [The party – the proletariansʼs protection], “HES” 04.12.1360AP /
23.02.1982, no. 228, p. 1; Poshtibani-ye mardom az hezb va davlat [The peopleʼs support for the
party and the government], “HES” 10.01.1361AP / 30.03.1982, no. 244, p. 1.
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a set of beliefs regarding the bonds between the party and the masses con-
stituting a combined political, cultural, economic and military proletarian
might. Its artistic visualisation is represented by a clenched fist, while the
globe symbolises the internationality of the Afghan proletarian movement41.
All the figures, being participants-and-contributors of a dialogue held by the
party and the masses, move along in the same direction and, apart from one
person, look towards the same point; apparently their march, even if slow,
is unremitting: “[the] progress of the revolution in Afghanistan is irrevers-
ible”42.The only manwho looks back shows indicates the way ahead with his
right hand and, waving at those who, by implication, lag behind, jollies them
along to join the whole group according to the popular rallying cry Workers
of the world, unite!, although no-where in the analysed Afghan press could its
Dari version – poroletarha-ye jahan muttahid shavid – be found!43. His ges-
ture can be also understood as an invitation to enrol in the PDPA made up
originally of students, teachers and disappointed bureaucrats only later affil-
iating a small number of new member classified as workers and peasants44.
It implies also voluntary participation of the citizens but the whole graphic
forges the reality as it does not mention the pressure exerted on government
employees to accept party cards:
The distribution of the party cards (…) that starts today is an im-
portant moment in the history of our party.This serious political
event is a powerful representative of the PDPA and its organisa-
tional strength45.
41 On the internationalism: B. Karmal, Kargaran-e Afqanestan! Ba hezb-etan, Hezb-e
Demukratik-e Khalq-e Afqanestan peyvandid! [Workers of Afghanistan! Join your party – the
Peopleʼs Democratic Party of Afghanistan] [in:] B. Karmal, Dar rah-e tahkim-e hakmiyat-e
khalq. Majmuʼe-ye bayahiyahawa neveshtaha (1358–1359) [Towards the strengthening ofmass
leadership. Collection of speeches and texts (1358–1359)], Kabol 1362AP/1983–4, pp. 135 ff.
42 B. Karmal, Zenda bad…, p. 410.
43 I only found it on one photography taken by S. Soboloev in 1979 in Kabul and re-printed in
L. Gerber, The Taliban in Afghanistan, New York 2011, p. 11.
44 B. R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. State Formation and Collapse in the Interna-
tional System, NewHaven–London 1995, p. 128. H. S. Bradsher called Afghan revolutionaries
ironically “teashop ones” (H. S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, Durham 1983,
p. 91).
45 B. Karmal, Kart-e ozviyyat-e Hezb-e Demukratik-e Khalq-e Afqanestan-ra chun sharaf-e khod
hefz mikonam va an-ra vahdat-e khadashe-ye napazir-e hezb-e qahreman-e khod midanam
[I protect my cart of the Peopleʼs Democratic Party of Afghanistan like my own honour and
consider it as the impregnable unity of the heroesʼ party] [in:] B. Karmal, Tahkim-e hezb va
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Having said all this, one question arises: does the observer understand
the message conveyed by the (non)iconic elements of the poster? Or maybe
such a composition transcends readability due to its socialist realistic nature?
To stay in power, the authorities must use phraseology that is clear for the
audience so the form of persuasion should be constructed collectively by ma-
nipulative practitioners. Those who are aware of Marxist-Leninist ideology
can more or less read the poster presented above. Those who are not will
not read it properly just as in the case of L. Wittgensteinʼs language-games
indicating that each action can be understood only because the participants
in the game have a priori knowledge regarding its rules. To learn the rules
one needs to be constantly surrounded by the object in the same way that
persuasion is more effective than compulsion because “[t]he transmutative
power of propaganda derives its energy from the permanent need of a man
to be perpetually enchanted with the world”46. In the case of Afghanistan,
access to such ideological posters, press or poetry was limited by the civil
war to major cities. Consequently, they did fall on deaf ears and despite all
their efforts, the PDPA was not able to broaden its social basis and to defeat
the counter-revolutionaries.
All the observations presented above are intended to simulate further,
more complex research on the subject and will, hopefully, allow two un-
solved questions to be answered:
(1) Changes in rhetoric used before and after 1978 as well as the possible
influence of the Soviet and Iranian communists’ phraseology;
(2) The culturally-dependant conceptualisation of the world into pictures.
Afghanistan, belonging to a Sunni zone, lies between two countries
where the image plays a significantly semantic role – Iran and Pakistan.
Can one speak about Iranian and Pakistani influences with regard to
usage of the picture as a means of communication, or not?
peyvand-e an ba khalq. Majmuʼe-ye bayaniyaha va neveshtaha (1360–1361) [The strengthening
of the party and its relations with the masses. A collection of speeches and texts (1360–1361)],
Kabol 1362AP/1983–4, p. 164.
46 P. Chelkowski, H. Dabashi, op. cit., p. 33.
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